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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
CAPITAL GAINS TREATMENT ON PROCEEDS FROM
PATENT TRANSFERS
INTRODUCTION
A frequently litigated question in the field of federal taxation is that of the
right of an inventor to receive capital gains treatment on the proceeds from the
sale of his patent. In 1954, Congress sought to alleviate some of the problems'in
this area by including a special provision in the new code by which an individual
inventor could be assured of capital gains treatment. Although this new legisla-
tion has solved some of the problems, at the same time it has created others. This
comment is an attempt to deal with some of the traditional problems in the light
of the new legislation, and also to examine some of the questions which this new
legislation has raised.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
As every student of the tax law is aware, Congress has long allowed special
tax treatment to certain types of property known as "capital assets."' The present
statutes2 were derived from earlier law3 with only minor changes.4 In Densmore v.
Scofield5 the Supreme Court held that "patents rightfully issued are property;"
and in Edward C. Myerss the Tax Court held that a patent could qualify as a
"capital asset" as defined by the Internal Revenue Code. In 1942, section 117(j)
was added to the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, enabling a taxpayer, with certain
limitations, to treat the sale or exchange of depreciable property used in his trade
or business as if it were the sale of a "capital asset."7 Although this section was
purportedly introduced to stimulate the sale of business properties so that they
would be more apt to come into the hands of persons who would use them most
efficiently for the war effort,8 Congress apparently felt the section was of con-
tinuing usefulness for it was re-enacted as section 1231 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 without significant change.9
Subject to certain statutory conditions, generally under section 1231 a gain
on the sale or exchange of real or depreciable personal property used in a trade
1. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 206, 42 Stat. 232.
2. INT. Rnv. CODE of 1954, §§ 1201, 1202, 1221.
3. Revenue Act of 1939, ch. 1, § 117, 53 Stat. 50 as amended.
4. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); 1954-3 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News, 4017, 4415.
5. 102 U.S. 375, 378 (1880).
6. 6 T.C. 258, 266 (1946).
7. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1221(2) specifically excludes "property, used
in a trade or business, of a character which is subject to depreciation" from the
definition of "capital asset."
8. S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); 1950-2 U.S. Code Cong.
" Ad. News 3053, 3105.
9. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); 1954-3 U.S. Code Cong.
" Ad. News 4017, 4417.
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or business and held for more than six months (e.g., industrial equipment and
real estate) is treated as 2 capital gain, but a loss is treated as an ordinary
loss.10 Although this section was held to be-applicable to patents,11 there has been
a vast amount of controversy concerning the eligibility of patent transfers for
treatment as capital transactions. The difficulty arises not in connection with the
nature of the property itself, but rather in connection with the method by which
it is transferred. Frequently the seller receives his consideration in the form of
"royalties" over a period of time generally coterminous with the life of the patent,
retaining a limited degree of control over the property until the full purchase
price is paid. Hence there is a problem in meeting the requirement that there be a
"sale or exchange" of the property. 2 The Commissioner maintained for a number
of years that where consideration for the transfer of a patent was received in the
form of "royalties" over a period conterminous with the life of the patent, the
transactions must be treated as a "license" and could not constitute a "sale"
within the meaning of the internal revenue statutes. The Commissioner's position
was supported primarily by two early Supreme Court decisions in which purported
patent assignments were held to be only licenses.' 3
In Waterman v. MacKenze,14 plaintiff was suing for infringement of a patent
basing his right to sue on an agreement whereby the owner of the patent had
granted to him ". . . the sole and exclusive right to manufacture and sell" under
the patent. The defendant contended that plaintiff had no right to sue for in-
fringement because he was a mere licensee. The Court held for the defendant on
the ground that the agreement under which plaintiff claimed his right to sue was
a license and not an assignment since there was no grant of the right to use the
patented item. The Court noted that:
The patentee or his assigns may, by instrument in writing, assign,
grant and convey, either, 1st, the whole patent, comprising the exclusive
right to make, use and vend the invention throughout the United States;
or 2d, an undivided part or share of that exclusive right; or 3d, the ex-
10. This is true when the taxpayer has only one transaction within the terms
of section 1231 during the year. On the other hand, if the taxpayer engages in
more than one transaction coming within the terms of section 1231, all gains and
losses from these transactions are aggregated in the "hotchpot." If the hotchpot
result is a net gain, then each transaction is either a capital gain or a capital loss;
but if the hotchpot result is a net loss, then each of the transactions is treated
as ordinary income or loss. Section 1231 differentiates between the taxDaver with
a net gain and the taxpayer with a net loss in order to preserve ordinary loss treat-
ment for taxpayers suffering the destruction or involuntary conversion of property
that has declined in value, while permitting gains from such occurrences to be
reported at the favorable capital gains rate. However, section 1231 as enacted went
beyond this purpose, also embracing a sale or exchange of business property as
well as an involuntary conversion.
11. General Spring Corp., 22 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 770 (1953). Accord: Per-
kins v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 618 (D.N.J. 1963).
12. INT. Rnv. CoDr of 1954, § 1231.
13. Waterman v. MacKenzie, 138 U.S. 252 (1891); United States v. General
Electric, 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
14. Waterman v. MacKenzie, supra note 13.
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clusive right under the patent within and throughout a specified part
of the United States. . . .A transfer of either of these three kinds of
interest is an assignment. . . Any assignment or transfer, short of one
of these, is a mere license .... 15
This language was cited in numerous cases as stating the basic criteria for the
"sale" of a patent for federal income tax purposes, and the Commissioner con-
sistently relied on it in a long line of cases to support his position that periodic
payments received for the use of a patent could not qualify for capital gains
treatment for want of a "sale or exchange."' 6
A turning point came in the case of Edward C. Myers.17 The taxpayer had
invented and patented a rubber-covered flexible steel track and in consideration
of certain annual royalties based on a percentage of sales, had transferred the
exclusive right to use, manufacture, and sell under the patent to B. F. Goodrich
Rubber Company. The Commissioner argued that the taxpayer's retention of the
right to terminate the agreement if a certain amount of royalty payments were
not made, and the fact that the licensee had the right to terminate after a certain
date, were completely inconsistent with a sale of the patent. This argument was
rejected, and it was held that these were merely conditions subsequent which did
not preclude the present passing of legal title. The Court quoted extensively from
Waterman v. MacKenzie,'s but distinguished it on the ground that there the
licensee's exclusive rights did not include express authorization to use the inven-
tion, whereas there had been such authorization in the instant case.
Shortly after the decision in the Myers case the Commissioner acquiesced,19
but four years later this acquiescence was revoked and non-acquiescence was sub-
stituted.20 In the opinion accompanying this non-acquiescence the service clearly
rejected the Myers decision, stating that in future cases where the owner of a
patent transfers rights in consideration for payments based on a percentage of
sales, or in consideration of periodic payments over a period essentially coter-
minous with the life of the patent, such a transfer was for tax purposes to be
regarded as a provision for royalty payments, taxable as ordinary income.
Subsequent developments in 1950 (the year of the Commissioner's non-
acquiescence) indicate that the Commissioner was not alone in his thinking that
Myers had gone too far in protecting the taxpayer-inventor. In that year Congress
enacted amendments to the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. Under these new
15. Id. at 255.
16. Parke, Davis & Co., 31 B.T.A. 427 (1934); Julius E. Lilienfield, 35
B.T.A. 391 (1937); Claude Neon Lights, Inc., 35 B.T.A. 424 (1937); Comm'r v.
Hopkinson, 126 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1942); Comm'r v. Celanese Corp., 140 F.2d
339 (D.C. Cir. 1944). It is interesting to note that Waterman, which was ironically
not even a tax case, has been cited as authority in nearly every patent tax case
involving the question of a "sale or exchange" within the past two decades.
17. 6 T.C. 258 (1946).
18. 138 U.S. 252 (1891).
19. 1946-1 CuM. BULL. 3.
20. Mimeograph 6490, 1950-1 CuM. BULL. 9.
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sections, capital assets21 and property used in a trade or business22 were redefined
to exclude a "copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition, or similar
property" when held by the creator or one whose basis was determined by refer-
ence to the creator's basis. Congress considered the potential capital gains treat-
ment of the income of amateur authors a "loophole" in the tax laws which they
should close. 23 The House version of the bill also included "inventors" and
"patents" in the same category but this portion of the bill was dropped in com-
mittee for the reason that "... . the desirability of fostering the work of such in-
ventors outweighs the small amount of additional revenue which might be ob-
tained... ,24 Although a reading of this committee report reveals that Congress
had in mind only the individual inventor, subsequent developments do not reveal
any attempts to withhold this advantageous tax treatment from corporations or
other legal entities.
Sympathy for the individual inventor carried into 1954, when Congress felt it
necessary, in view of the Commissioner's complete rejection of the Myers decision,
to assure certain inventors that receipts from the transfer of their inventions would
be eligible for capital gains treatment even though the method of payment was
in the form of royalties. In addition, Congress felt the distinction under existing law
whereby amateur inventors could potentially receive capital gains treatment but
professional inventors could not (since they would be deemed to be holding the
property for re-sale to customers) was an unfair distinction that should be elim-
inated.25 Also eliminated was the six month holding period ordinarily required for
long term capital gains treatment. Consequently, section 1235 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 provides that the individual inventor is eligible for long
term capital gains treatment upon the transfer of all substantial rights to his
patent regardless of whether he is in the business of inventing, the period held, or
the method of payment.
There is little discussion in the committee reports as to why this section was
limited to individuals, except for the notation that by the enactment of section
1235 Congress had ".... no intention of affecting the operation of existing law in
those areas without its scope." 26 The Commissioner's response to this enactment
was the announcement that in all cases in which the newly enacted section 1235
was not applicable he would continue to oppose the Myers decision. 27 The Com-
missioner also noted that section 1235, as enacted, was applicable only to taxable
years after December 31, 1953, and stated that he would refuse application of
21. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117(a) (1) (c); now INr. REv. CODE of 1954,
§ 1221(3).
22. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117(j)(1)(c); now INT. REv. CODE of 1954,
§ 1231(b) (1) (c).
23. S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); 1950-2 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 3053, 3097-3098.
24. Ibid.; 1950-2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3098.
25. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); 1954-3 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 4017, 4421.
26. Ibid.; 1954-3 US. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5084.
27. Rev. Rul. 55-58, 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 97.
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Sectioh 1235 to taxable years within the period between May 31, 1950,28 and
December 31, 1953.
In 1956, Congress, perhaps impressed by the Commissioner's obstinance,
amended the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 to make the benefits of section 1235
of the 1954 Code available to taxpayers in taxable years after May 31, 1950, re-
gardless of the year in which the transfer occurred 29 This legislation apparently
represented victory for the taxpayer for the Commissioner announced 0 that in
view of several recent decisions by the Tax Court 3l he was re-considering his non-
acquiescence in the Myers decision. He subsequently withdrew his non-acquiescence
and agreed to follow the Myers decision in future cases.
With the Commissioner's acquiescence in Myers it appeared that the indi-
vidual inventor might obtain capital gains treatment alternatively under sections
1221, 1231, or 1235. Similarly, the door was now open for a patent holder in-
eligible under section 1235 to look to sections 1221 and 1231 for capital gains treat-
ment even though the consideration was to be paid in the form of royalties.
II. Is 1235 ExcLusivE?
Section 123532 by its terms applies only to individuals whose efforts created
the invention or individuals other than relatives or employers who acquired an
interest in the patent in consideration for money paid to the inventor prior to
actual reduction of the invention to practice. Thus section 1235 applies to only a
limited class of individuals. An important question is whether those individuals
described as holders who do not otherwise qualify under section 1235 are pre-
cluded from seeking capital gains treatment under the general capital gains
provisions of the law.
It should be pointed out that while several benefits are available to a tax-
payer under section 1235,83 the primary benefit which Congress had in mind in
enacting that section was to insure the availability of capital gains treatment to
an inventor even though he received compensation for the transfer of the patent
in the form of royalties payable periodically over the life of the patent, or with
payment contingent on the productivity or use of the patent by the transferee 3 4
28. This was the date to which the Commissioner retroactively applied his
non-acquiescence in Edward C. Myers, 6 T.C. 258 (1946). See textual matter
accompanying footnote 19.
29. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 11 7 (q). S. REP. No. 1941, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.
3 (1956). Congress specifically noted that the enactment of this amendment was
necessary to negate the effect of the Commissioner's ruling.
30. Rev. Rul. 58-353, 1958-2 CUM. BULL. 408.
31. Leonard Coplan, 28 T.C. 1189 (1957); Roy J. Champayne, 26 T.C. 634
(1956).
32. All further references to the "Code" (or to "sections" thereof) shall mean
the INT. Ray. CODE of 1954, as amended to date.
33. E.g., no six month holding period, no disqualification for those in the
"business" of inventing.
34. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); 1954-3 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 4422.
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This. was in effect afi- expansioh of the Myers decision,35 which the Commissioner
had refused to follow until section 1235 was enacted. Thus, when the Commis-
sioner finally acquiesced in the Myers decision in 1958,36 section 1235 was no
longer necessary to accomplish the primary objective for which it had been
enacted.
Until the recent case of Myron C. PooleS7 it had been tacitly assumed by
the courts and the Commissioner that an individual inventor who was unable to
satisfy the requirements of section 1235 would not be precluded from seeking
capital gains treatment under the general capital gains provisions of the law. In
Leonard Coplan,85 the taxpayer-inventor was dearly ineligible for the benefits of
section 123539 in view of the fact that he sought capital gains treatment on the
proceeds from the sale of a patent to a 100% controlled corporation. ° Neither
the Commissioner nor the taxpayer made any argument that section 1235 should
apply or that the existence of that section foreclosed the taxpayer from seeking
capital gains treatment under the general provisions of the law. The Court, how.
ever, on its own initiative, noted that the Government could have argued that
section 1235 was the exclusive means by which an individual inventor could re-
ceive capital gains treatment, and that considerable support for that position
could be found in the legislative history of section 1235. The Court did not decide
this question, however, and ruled in favor of the taxpayer on the ground that he
had fulfilled the requirements for capital gains under the general provisions of the
law.
Subsequent cases held in favor of the taxpayer on the ground that section 1235
did not preclude resort to the general capital gains provisions in cases where the
taxpayer was unable to meet the requirements of that section.41 The Commissioner
appeared to agree with this position in 1957 when he issued his regulations under
section 1235.42 These regulations provide that section 1235 is to be disregarded
in determining whether or not there has been a sale or exchange of a capital asset
in cases not specifically within its terms. Cited as an example of a situation not
35. 6 T.C. 258 (1946).
36. Rev. Rul. 58-353, 1958-2 Cum. BULL. 408.
37. 46 T.C. 392 (1966).
38. 28 T.C. 1189 (1957).
39. This actually involved § 117(q), Int Rev. Code of 1939, as amended, but
as this section is identical with § 1235 of the 1954 Code, reference will be made
to the latter section in this and all subsequent cases to avoid confusion.
40. Section 1235(d) (1) specifically excludes the benefits of that section to
transfers between an individual and a 25% controlled corporation. At the time
of this case the applicable figure was "more than 50%." Also, § 117(o), Int. Rev.
Code of 1939 (the equivalent of § 1239 of the present Code) which precluded
capital gains treatment of proceeds from a sale to a corporation in which the
transferor and his family owned more than 80% of the corporate stock, was not
applicable to this transfer, which occurred in 1950. That section applied only to
transfers after May 3, 1951.
41. Herbert C. Johnson, 30 T.C. 675 (1958); Sheen v. United States, 167
F. Supp. 543 (E.D. Penn. 1958); George N. Soffron, 35 T.C. 787 (1961); Julian
A. McDermott, 41 T.C. 50 (1963); James C. Hamrick, 43 T.C. 21 (1964).
42. 22 F.R. 8899, 1957-2 CuM. BuLL. 570.
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covered by section 1235 is "... . a transfer by a holder to a related person ... ,"43
which is excluded from the benefits of section 1235 by 1235(d) (2). Several writers
similarly concluded that section 1235 was not the exclusive means by which an
individual failing to qualify under that section could receive capital gains treat-
ment on the transfer of a patent.44
With this background it was surprising when the Tax Court in Myron C.
Poole45 held unequivocally that section 1235 is the exclusive means by which
an individual inventor can receive capital gains treatment on the proceeds of a
transfer of a patent interest as described in that section. The taxpayer in Poole
was the inventor and holder of a patent on a window designed for use in mobile
homes. He transferred his interest in the patent to a corporation in which he
owned 50% of the stock and contended that he was entitled to the benefits of
section 1235. The court held that while the taxpayer in form controlled only 50%
of the stock, in substance he controlled all of it and thus was not entitled to the
benefits of section 1235.
Alternatively, the taxpayer contended that he was entitled to capital gains
treatment on his income by virtue of the general capital gains provisions of the
law. The court rejected this argument, and held that for any transaction which
is described in section 1235(2), that section is the exclusive means by which a
"holder" as defined in the section can obtain capital gains treatment on the pro-
ceeds from the sale of a patent. The court recognized that the regulations suggest
a different result but based its holding on the legislative history of section 1235.
Although the Poole decision is unfavorable to the taxpayer-inventor, the result
does seem to reflect the legislative purpose behind section 1235. The House Com-
mittee Report on this section states that:
This section provides the only method under the new code whereby
the inventor of a patent can obtain capital gains on its sale. Failure on
the part of the seller to meet its conditions will result (retroactively, if
necessary) in the entire transaction being taxed to him as resulting in
ordinary income.40
Similar language is found in the Senate Report on this code section.47 Also, the
committee reports on the 1958 amendment4 s to section 1235 contain language gen-
erally consistent with that of the House Committee Report.49
43. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-1(b) (1957).
44. Porter, Capital Gains on Patents Without Benefit of Section 1235, 41
TAXEs 800 (1963); Bailey, The Inventor, 15TH ANmuA N.Y. UNIv. INST. ON FED.
TAXATION 285 (1957); Mann, Summary of Prevailing Case Law on Tax Aspecty
of Sales or Exchange of Patent Rights, 40 TAXEs 767 (1962).
45. 46 T.C. 392 (1966).
46. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); 1954-3 U.. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 4017, 4422.
47. S. REP. to accompany H.R. 8300; 1954-3 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News
4621, 5081.
48. This amendment to § 1235(d) changed the exclusionary provision of
§ 1235 from transfers to "more than 50%" controlled corporations to transfers to
"25% or more" controlled corporations.
49. H.R. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1958).
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The committee reports that support the decision in the Poole case also offer
some explanation for the earlier decisions50 of the courts on the issue of whether
section 1235 is exclusive. Congress made it clear in enacting section 1235 that it
did not intend to preclude capital gains treatment under existing law in the case
of those individuals and types of transfers not qualifying under that section.5 1
But individuals who are described as "holders," while failing to meet other re-
quirements of section 1235 have argued that their transfers were beyond the scope
of that section. They have relied on statements such as "In enacting this section
...your committee has no intention of affecting the operation of existing law in
those areas without its scope" 52 to support their contention that failure to qualify
under section 1235 does not preclude them from resorting to other capital gains
provisions of the law. While this statement could be taken as authority for the
proposition that section 1235 is in no way exclusive, it is evident from the legislative
history as a whole that the intent of Congress was to make 1235 exclusive in the
case of transfers described in 1235(a) by "holders" as defined in 1235(d). It is
not, on the other hand, the exclusive means for obtaining capital gains treatment
on transactions outside the scope of section 1235.
The Poole case is of particular significance in that it is often desirable to
employ the corporate form of doing business to insure the success of any new in-
vention. The personal desires of the individual inventor may make it desirable
in many instances to limit the shareholders to members of the family, but under
the provisions of section 1235(d) the individual will be precluded from the bene-
fits of that section on a transfer to a corporation in which he and the members of
his family own more than 25% of the corporate stock. In addition, under the
Poole decision he will be precluded from receiving capital gains treatment on such
a transfer under the general provisions of the law.
The problem is further complicated by the fact that it is unlikely that the
taxpayer will be able to avoid the effect of the Poole case by having the patent
issued in the name of a corporation or other legal entity. Under the patent laws
application for a patent must be made in the name of the original inventor.53
While the statutes permit the patent to issue in the name of an assignee of the
inventor,54 the fact that the original application must be made in the name of
the individual inventor would almost certainly preclude the taxpayer from avoiding
the effect of Poole (and the statutory policy it represents) in this manner.
III. WHAT CONSTITUTES A SALE OF A PATENT?
A. The Significance of Section 1235
The basic requirement of both sections 1235 and the general capital gains
provisions is a "sale" of-or, in 1235 terminology, a transfer of "all substantial
50. Cases cited footnote 42 supra.
51. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2nd Sess. 3 (1954).
52. Ibid.; 1954-3 US. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5082.
.53. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1952).
54. 35 U.S.C. § 152 (1952).
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rights" to-the patent. Of major concern in this regard are the questions of what
rights a transferor of a patent may retain and still meet the requirement of a sale,
and of what differences there are between section 1235 and the general capital gains
provisions with regard to this requirement. The following discussion is necessarily
limited to the more commonly encountered problems and is not meant to be
exhaustive of all of the potential problems.
Since the Commissioner has set forth regulations55 as to what will qualify as a
transfer of "all substantial rights" under section 1235, there has been a tendency
to rely on these regulations in determining what constitutes a "sale or exchange"
under the general capital gains provisions in instances where transfers by "holders"
are not involved. A careful reading of the two sections and the legislative history
raises the question of whether this reliance is proper. Although Congress stated that
the criteria to be used in determining whether there was a 'transfer of "all substan-
tial rights" to a patent under section 1235 were the same as those which had been
used to determine the issue of "sale or exchange" under prior law,56 at the same time
limitations were imposed on the scope of section 1235 which were not found in
prior law.
In describing the term "undivided interest" as it is used in section 1235, the
committee reports stated that it was to include those interests which included
".. a part of each property right represented by the patent . . . (and not, for
example, a lesser interest such as a right to income, or a license limited geo-
graphically, or a license which conveys some, but not all, of the claims or uses
covered by the patent)."'57 This characterization is more narrow than the basic
test outlined in Waterman v. MacKenzie0 8 and reaffirmed in Edward C. Myers.5"
In keeping with this legislative purpose, the regulations 60o specifically disallow
capital gains treatment for a transfer of patent rights limited geographically or
industrially or to a transfer which covers some but not all of the claims or inven-
tions covered by the patent. All of these limitations have been held not to preclude
a sale of a patent in cases where section 1235 was not applicable.6 1
B. Geographical Limitations on the Rights Transferred
Following the language of the Supreme Court in Waterman v. MacKenzie,62
subsequent cases have generally sustained capital gains treatament on patent
transfers even though the, transferee's rights are subject to specific geographical
limitations. This was the result where the taxpayer entered into two essentially
55. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235 (1957).
56. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1954); 1954-3 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 5334.
57. Id. at 5082.
58. 138 U.S. 252 (1891).
59. 6 T.C. 258 (1946).
60. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b) (c).
61. See discussion infra, pt. III, §§ B, C, of this comment.
62. Dunn, Tax Considerations in Patent Assignments and Licenses between
Related Corporations, 16 TAx. L. REv. 315 (1961).
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identical agreements for the transfer of the exclusive right to manufacture, use,
sell, and distribute under certain patents held by him-one agreement for exclu-
sive rights throughout the United States east of the Mississippi River, the other
for the same rights west of the river.63 Similarly, the transfer of all exclusive
rights under a patent ". . . within the United States" was held to be a sale of that
portion of the patent and not a mere license.64 In another case where the issue
was whether or not an industrial limitation on a patent transfer would preclude
a sale, the Commissioner conceded that a geographical limitation would be per-
missible.65 This same privilege is expressly withheld from the 1235 "holder" by
regulations 66 in keeping with the intent of Congress in enacting that section.67
C. Industrial Limitations and Other "Carved Out!" Interests
1. Industrial
In United States v. Carruthers,68 the taxpayer assigned all rights under the
patent owned by him to a corporation, but limited their use to the canning indus-
try. The Commissioner contended that the reservation of the right to grant ex-
clusive rights in other industries was inconsistent with a sale and thus construed
the agreement as a license. The court quoted from Waterman v. MacKenzie,9
noting that the Commissioner accepted the rule that an agreement limited geo-
graphically would still be a sale if all rights under the patent within a specified
area were transferred. Holding for the taxpayer, the court stated: "No explanation
has been attempted by appellant [Commissioner], nor has it proffered any policy
argument as to why a transfer enveloping an industry should be given such dif-
ferent tax treatment from a transfer encompassing an area."70
In American Ckemical Paint Company v. Smittz,71 an excess profits tax case,
handed down shortly after the Carruthers decision, the taxpayer had reserved all
rights to the patent ". . . in fields outside the general field of usefulness . . ." as
described in the agreement. Holding for the Commissioner, the court distinguished
Carruthers on the ground that the court in Carruthers had specifically recognized
that there was no evidence that the invention had any value for any purpose other
than processing tuna, and thus, even though the assignment was limited to that
particular industry, it was in fact a transfer of all rights under the patent. It ap-
63. Vincent A. Marco, 25 T.C. 544 (1955). This case involved tax years
before the effective date of § 1235.
64. Watson v. United States, 222 F.2d 689 (10th Cir. 1955). This case in-
volved tax years prior to the effective date of § 1235.
65. United States v. Carruthers, 219 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1955). This case in-
volved tax years prior to the effective date of § 1235.
66. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235(2)(6)(1).
67. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); 1954-3 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 5082.
68. 219 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1955).
69. 138 U.S. 252 (1891).
70. 219 F.2d 21, 24"(9th Cir. 1955).
71. 131 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
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pears the same result could have been reached without limiting the scope of
Carruthers for the taxpayer had also placed a geographical limitation72 on the
transfer.
These two cases do raise the important question of whether the courts should
distinguish, for federal tax purposes, between industrial and geographical limita-
tions in patent transfers. Courts that have upheld sales of patent interests subject
to geographical limitations have invariably done so on the unquestioned authority
of Waterman v. MacKenzie, and most of the arguments against permitting indus-
trial limitations have been based on the premise that Waterman did not recognize
such a limitation. Surprisingly, no court has sought to analyze the rationale of the
Waterman decision. The Supreme Court in deciding that case, an infringement
suit, relied upon the statute dealing with patent ownership and assignment 73 in
holding that a conveyance of "... the exclusive right under the patent throughout
a specified part of the United States" constituted an assignment. Similar language
is contained in the present statute,7 4 and courts in areas other than the tax field
have generally held that anything short of an "assignment" as defined in Water-
man v. MacKenzie will be construed as a license.75 In view of the fact that
Waterman was not a tax case and that general principles of law are not necessarily
controlling in the tax field, the question remains whether the test set forth in that
decision should invariably be conrollling in tax cases. The court in Carruthers7 o
had answered this question in the negative. Following this rationale, the soundness
of the distinction between the transfer of patent rights subject to geographical
limitations and the transfer of these rights subject to industrial limitations would
seem questionable, since both transfers would have economic consequences similar
to a transfer of an "undivided interest." A transfer of all rights under a patent as
they may be used in the "canning industry" may represent as complete and un-
-equivocal relinquishment of rights as the transfer of an undivided one-half interest.
A transfer of an undivided interest is specifically recognized as the equivalent of a
sale for purposes of section 1235. 77
Notwithstanding the decision in American Chemical Paint Company, several
72. The taxpayer had reserved "[t]he right to manufacture in the United
States and Canada for sale and use only in countries other than the United States
and Canada, materials covered by any of the inventions and discoveries and
patent applications and patents included or to be included in this license agree-
ment." Id. at 738.
73. REv. STAT. § 4898 (1875), derived from Act of July 8, 1870, c. 230, § 36,
16 Stat. 203.
74. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1954) states: "The applicant, patentee, or his assigns
or legal representative may in like manner grant and convey an exclusive right
under his application for patent, or patents, to the whole or any specified part of
the United States."
75. Kenyon v. Automatic Instrument Co., 160 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1947);
Doherty Research Co. v. Vickers Petroleum Co., 80 F.2d 809 (10th Cir. 1936).
76. 219 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1955).
77. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(c) (1957) defines an "undivided interest" in all
substantial rights to a patent as the same fractional share of each and every sub-
stantial right to the patent.
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decisions in cases involving transfers limited to specific industries or uses have fol-
lowed Carrmthers"s And the same result was reached where the transfer involved
the grant of the exclusive right to manufacture, use, and sell one of several com-
pounds in a class.7 9 Apparently other compounds covered by the patent were
equally valuable. Citing the Carruthers case, and reasoning that the effect was
analogous to a transfer limited industrially, the court held that there could be a
sale for tax purposes of one of several claims represented by a single patent.
2. Other "Carved Out" Interests-Impact of 1235
In Allied Chemical Corporation v. United States,8 0 the transfer involved a
patent covering an anti-fungus wrapper which could be used for several different
purposes. The transfer agreement had expressly limited the use of the patent to
the cheese wrapper industry. Although holding that there was not a sale of even
a part of the patent rights in this case since the taxpayer had retained the "sub-
stantial right" to license others in the same field in which it had allegedly sold
its rights under the patent, the court recognized that ". . . a transfer of a single
claim or a single field of use covered by a patent may be accorded capital gains
treatment. . .."81
The Commissioner cited the regulations under section 1235 as authority for
his position that a transfer of patent rights limited to a particular industry could
not qualify for capital gains treatment. The court, however, distinguished the
requirements of section 1235 and of section 1231 for the sale of a patent, noting
that section 1235 was not applicable to the present case involving a corporate
taxpayer.
Two cases arising under section 1235 reached the conclusion that a transfer
of rights limited to a particular claim inder a patent may still qualify under
section 1235 for capital gains treatment, in clear contradiction of the regulations.
In one,82 the deceased inventor had invented a "closure valve" which was in-
tended to have wide application in all types of pressure vessels and pipelines includ-
ing but not limited to "gate valves." In a subsequent assignment of rights under
the patent it was specifically noted that "The license granted herein is nonexclu-
sive as to the entire invention, but is exclusi,e so far as the invention can be
applied to gate valves. ... ,,83 In the other,84 the Tax Court stated that the ques-
tion before it was whether "a patent or patent application may be separated into
different fields of application, and whether each field can be transferred to a
different transferee with the transfer being considered under section 1235(a) as
78. Commercial Solvents Corporation, 42 T.C. 455 (1964); Bannister v. United
States,-262 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1958); First National Bank of Princeton v. United
States, 136 F. Supp. 818 (D.NJ. 1955).
79. Merck & Co., Inc. v. Smith, 261 F.2d 162 (3rd Cir. 1958).
80. 17 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
81. Id. at 321.
:82. Estate of Milton P. Laurent, Sr., 34 T.C. 385 (1960).
83. Id. at 388.
84. William S. Rouveral, 42 T.C. 186 (1964).
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a sale or exchange of a capital asset."8 5 Again the court answered in the affirma-
tive.
Under other circumstances the decisions in these two "12 35 cases" would be
heralded as a major gain for taxpayers who must meet the requirements of sec-
tion 1235. But in view of the clear statement in the committee reports that Con-
gress did not intend for the benefits of section 1235 to be available in the case
of ". . a license which conveys some, but not all of the claims or uses covered
by the patent,"8 6 it would seem apparent that these decisions are directly con-
trary to the Congressional intent. Furthermore, in light of the Poole case,87 the
Tax Court may be reexamining other aspects of patent transfers, and it is evident
that prior case law will not preclude a change in position to conform with the
legislative purpose. For these reasons it is suggested that these two decisions are
very questionable authority.
D. Retentwn of Title by the Transferor
Although the regulations state that retention of bare legal title by the trans-
feror will not preclude a sale of a patent under section 1235,88 the Commissioner
has frequently argued in cases arising under the general capital gains provisions of
the law that retention of title by the transferor indicates that there has been no
sale of an interest in a patent. Judicial comment on the point is not abundant. In
Parke, Davis & Company,89 however, the court noted that for tax purposes the
inquiry should concern the ownership of the beneficial interest rather than of the
legal title. "Legal title alone, without beneficial ownership, and held for the in-
terest of another, is without value. . . . Unquestionably, an equitable interest in
patents is subject to transfer." 90 Similarly, in Carl G. Dreymann9l the court noted
that the transferee's "right to legal title was specifically enforceable in equity, and,
as of the time her equitable title vested, she had a right, title and estate in and
to property."02 Consequently, although retention of legal title by the transferor
may be a significant factor it is clearly not sufficient alone to prevent the estab-
lishment of a sale.
E. Prohibitions Against Sub-licensing and Sub-assignent
It is often advantageous for the transferor to restrict the transferees rights
to sub-assign and sub-license under the patent, especially where the transferor re-
tains an interest in the patent. The regulations state that retention by the trans-
85. Id. at 192.
86. S. REP. To Accompany H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); 1954-3
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5082. See discussion pt. III, § A-,of this c6mment.
87. Myron C. Poole, 46 T.C. 392 (1966). See discussion s-apra pt. II.
88. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(2)(i) (1957).
89. 31 B.T.A. 427 (1937).
90. Id. at 431.
91. 11 T.C. 153 (1948). This case involved tax years before the effective date
of § 1235.
92. Id. at 160.
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feror of the right to prohibit sublicensing or subassignment by the,"may or may
not, preclude a sale for purposes of section 1235 ". . . depending upon the circum-
stances of the whole transaction . ... ."9 Such limitations on the transferee's rights
have generally been held not to preclude a sale for tax purposes of an interest in
a patent. But there was no sale where the transferor had reserved the power to
disallow any sublicensing agreement and numerous and extensive other rights.9 4
Similarly, in Allied Chemical Corporation v. United States,9 5 the transferor not
only controlled the transferee's sublicensing, but also retained the power to sub-
license others in the same field in which the transferee had been licensed.
However, it seems likely that in most cases where the transferor simply re-
stricts the transferee's right to sub-license or to sub-assign the patent. interest, this
will not prevent a sale. For example, where the taxpayer had transferred certain
patents subject to his right to disapprove any licensing agreement between the
transferee and a third party, the court held for the taxpayer. The court found that
this limitation did not substantially impede the transferee's otherwise absolute
dominion over the property, and that it was in fact a reasonable safeguard against,
the transferee's intentional avoidance of royalty payments by curtailing his own
production in favor of licensing others.0 6
A similar example9 involved a restriction on subassignment. The taxpayer
granted the exclusive right to manufacture, use, and sell a patented invention in
return for royalty payments of 1% of sales. The court held for the taxpayer,
noting that "It is significant that there was in the instant case unlimited right to
sublicense.'. . . The prohibition against complete assignment of the license con-
tract without licensor's consent is understandable where the payment for the
transfer of the total rights is to depend on future profits from manufacture and
sale."98 This case is representative of the weight of authority on this issue. How-
ever, the language emphasizing that the transferee did have the unlimited right
to sublicense should probably not be taken as a limitation on the holding, as other
courts have not appeared to recognize this limitation. 9
F. Transferors Right to Terminate; Time Limitation
on the Rights Transferred
In the leading case of Edward C. Myers,'00 the taxpayer retained the right
to terminate the agreement if a certain amount of royalties were not paid. The
93. Treas: Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(3) (1957).
94. Watkins v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 718 (D. Conn. 1957). This case
involved tax years both before and after the effective date of § 1235.
95. 17 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
96. Thompson v. Johnson, 42 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). This
case involved tax years before the effective date of § 1235.
97. Carroll Pressure Roller Corporation, 28 T.C. 1288 (1957).
98. Id. at 1293.
99. Watson v. United States, 222 F.2d 689; Allen v. Werner, 190 F.2d 840(5th Cir. 1951); First Nat'l Bank of Princeton v. United States. 136 F. Supp. 818(D.N.J. 1955); Bell Intercontinental Corporation v. United States, 20 Am. Fed. Tax
R.2d 5153 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
100. 6 T.C. 258 (1946).
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agreement also gave to the transferee the right to terminate on sixty days written
notice. The court rejected the Commissioner's argument that these provisions were
incompatible with a sale of the patent and held that they were mere "conditions
subsequent" which did not interfere with passage of tide. The regulations 101
specifically recognize that retention by the transferor of rights ". . . in the nature
of a condition subsequent ... " will not preclude a sale of a patent interest under
that section.
An opposite result was reached, however, where the taxpayer had entered into
an agreement which he claimed was a sale of a patent interest but which was
terminable at the will of the transferor after six months.102 Similarly, the limits
of the Myers decision had been tested in an earlier case L03 where the taxpayer
claimed capital gains treatment on proceeds from the transfer of patent rights to
a corporation under a one year agreement subject to cancellation by either party
at any time during the year on sixty days notice. The court held summarily that
the retention of such an extensive right by the transferor was indicative of a
license rather than a sale.
The distinction between Myers and these other decisions was clarified in the
case of Bell Intercontinental.0 4 One of several agreements in issue involved the
transfer of a patent for consideration in the form of royalties, where the agree-
ment was terminable at the will of the transferor after ten years. The court held
for the government, noting that ordinarily the transfer of an interest in a patent
terminable at the will of the transferor would constitute a license. The court stated
that only if it could be shown that this right had no practical value, or if the
agreement was terminable only on the occurrence of some future event beyond
the control of the transferor, would it be construed as a condition subsequent to
a sale.10 5 In Myers, for example, the transferor's right to terminate had been con-
ditioned upon the failure of the transferee's royalty payments to be a certain
amount.
G. Limitations on thze Transferee's Righzt t Sue for Infringement
Although the courts have not accepted the argument that the retention of the
right to sue for infringement necessarily precludes the finding of a sale, the courts
have on occasion accepted the fact that the right was transferred as evidence of a
sale where otherwise they might have found only a license.
In Parke, Davis & Co.,106 the agreement in question provided that the tax-
payer-assignor was to take appropriate legal action to enjoin any infringement
101. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2 (b') (2) (ii) (1965).
102. Arthur M. Young, 29 T.C. 850 (1958). This was a "1235 case."
103. Lynne Gregg, 18 T.C. 291 (1952), aff'd 203 F.2d 954 (3rd Cir. 1953).
This-case involved tax years prior to the effective date of § 1235.
104. Bell Intercontinental Corp. v. United States, 20 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5153
(Ct. Cl. 1967).
105. Id. at 5163.
106. 31 B.T.A. 427 (1934).
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(taxpayer had retained legal title), but that the cost of such litigation as well as
any recovery was to be shared equally by the transferee to whom a one-half in-
terest in the patent had been transferred. The court held that retention of legal
title was not inconsistent with a sale, and neither was the right to sue for infringe-
ment where suit was to be brought for the benefit of the transferee and costs and
recovery were to be borne by him and received by him in proportion to his in-
terest. Under such circumstances, the taxpayer retained only bare legal title. The
court emphasized that the right to maintain a suit at law is often controlled by the
question of possession of "naked legal title" but that questions of income tax
liability should turn instead on possession of beneficial interest.
The same result was reached where the transferor of a patent interest had
expressly agreed to defend at its own expense any patent infringement suits brought
against the transferee and to reimburse it for any financial losses resulting there-
from.' 07 The court noted that there was no inconsistency between passage of title
and the transferor's obligation to defend assaults upon the purchaser's title, such
covenants being common provisions in most real property conveyances. But
reservation by the transferor of the right to sue for infringement where the
transferor retains numerous other rights is one factor in determining whether
there is a sale.' 08 As the court in Oak Manufaciuring Company v. United States o9
stated, the right to control infringement suits was only one of a "substantial bundle
of sticks" retained by the transferor which precluded a sale of the patent.
On the other hand, the right in the transferee to sue for infringement may
be indicative of a sale.11° Thus where the agreement stated: "This agreement shall
be construed as a license of the aforesaid patents and not an assignment thereof.
.... '411 the Commissioner strenuously argued that the language was so clear and
unambiguous that this could not possibly be considered a sale. But an examination
of the agreement as a whole made it clear that in spite of the language of the
parties the intent was clearly to transfer all beneficial interest to the licensee. The
court noted that, in addition to having exclusive rights under the patent with
regard to use, manufacture, and sales, it was "very significant" that the licensee
possessed the right to enforce the patent rights in his own name, retaining as his
own any recoveries."12 These cases were decided before section 1235 had become
effective, or involved taxpayers not eligible under that section, but it seems likely
that a similar approach would also be adopted in a case arising under section
1235.113
107. First Nat'l Bank of Princeton v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 818 (D.N.J.
1955).
108. Oak Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 301 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1962);
'Lynne Gregg, 203 F.2d 954 (3rd Cir. 1953).
109. 301 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1962).
110. Pike v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1951).
111.Id. at 101.
112. Ibid.
113. The-regulations under § 1235 do not mention the question of the possible
effect of the retention of the right to sue, or of the obligation to defend, upon the
existence of a "sale or exchange" under § 1235.
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H. Limitations on the Number of Rights Retained '
Although it may be stated as a general proposition that retention by the
transferor of the rights here discussed will not preclude a sale of the patent for tax
purposes, it must be borne in mind that any individual case must be decided on
its facts, and it is not suggested that in any given case every one of the rights
mentioned in the foregoing discussion could be retained. On the other hand, it is
clear that several of the rights herein mentioned may remain in the transferor
without precluding a sale.114
IV. CONCLUSION
The tax law in the field of patent transfers has shown a tendency to develop
favorably for the taxpayer. The decision in Myron C. Poole115 that the individual
inventor qualifying as a "holder" under section 1235 will henceforth have to look
exclusively to that section in order to receive capital gains treatment shows, how-
ever, that such a trend is not inexorable.
It is probable that the law in this area will eventually draw a clearer distinc-
tion between the requirements for capital gains treatment under section 1235 and
the requirements under the general capital gains provisions of the law. It is now
established that the transferor of a patent may retain legal title, impose time
limitations, or retain various other rights such as the right to license others in
certain geographical areas or industries, the right to prohibit subassignments and
sublicenses, or the right to control infringement litigation, without precluding a
"sale or exchange" of the patent under the general capital gains provisions. On the
other hand, it is clear that capital gains treatment under section 1235 ,will be de-
nied to transfers which are limited geographically or industrially.
J. DAviD WHARTON
114, First Nat'l Bank of Princeton v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 818 (D.N.J.
1955); Edward C. Myers, 6 T.C. 258 (1946).
115. 46 T.C. 392 (1966).
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